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Algorithm-based decision tools in environmental law appear policy neutral
but embody bias and hidden values that affect equity and democracy. In effect,
algorithm-based tools are new fora for law and policymaking, distinct from
legislatures and courts. In turn, these tools influence the development and
implementation of environmental law and regulation. As a practical matter,
there is a pressing need to understand how these automated decision-making
tools interact with and influence law and policy. This Article begins this timely
and critical discussion.
Though algorithmic decision making has been critiqued in other domains
like policing and housing policy, climate change makes algorithms in
environmental and energy policy distinct. Expectations of climatic stationarity—
for example, how frequently or severely a coastal area floods or how many days
of extreme heat an energy system needs to anticipate—are no longer valid.
Algorithm-based tools are necessary to make sense of possible future scenarios
in an unstable climate. Yet, dependence on these tools brings with it a conflict
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between technocracy (and the need to rapidly adapt and respond to climate
change) and democratic participation, which is fundamental to equity. This
Article discusses sources of that tension within algorithm-based tools and offers
a pathway forward to integrate values of equity and democratic participation
into these tools.
After introducing the challenge of adapting water and energy systems to
climate change, this Article synthesizes prior multidisciplinary work on
algorithmic decision making and modeling-informed governance—bringing
together the works of early climate scientists and contemporary leaders in
algorithmic decision making. From this synthesis, this Article presents a
framework for analyzing how well these tools integrate principles of equity,
including procedural and substantive fairness—both of which are essential to
democracy. The framework evaluates how the tools handle uncertainty,
transparency, and stakeholder collaboration across two attributes. The first
attribute has to do with the model itself—specifically, how and whether existing
law and policy are incorporated into these tools. These social parameters can be
incorporated as inputs to the model or in the structure of the model, which
determines its logic. The second attribute has to do with the modeling process—
how and whether stakeholders and end-users collaborated in the model’s
development.
The Article then applies this framework and compares two algorithmassisted decision-making tools currently in use for adapting water and energy
systems to climate change. The first tool is called “INFORM.” It is used to
allocate water quantity and flow on the Sacramento River, while taking climate
and weather into account. The second tool is called “RESOLVE.” It is used by
energy utility regulators in California to evaluate scenarios for energy
generation. Although the development of both tools involved collaborative
processes, there are meaningful distinctions in the history of their development
and use. The comparisons indicate that how law and policy are incorporated into
the underlying code of models influences the development and regulation of
climate adaptation, while inclusiveness and collaboration during the model’s
development influences the model’s perceived usefulness and adoption. Both
conclusions have implications for equity and accessibility of environmental,
natural resource, and energy planning.
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INTRODUCTION
As the reality of climate change becomes more present,1 a quiet revolution
is changing the governance of water and energy systems. Algorithmic tools that
shape the regulation of these two systems are new fora for law and policymaking.
Federal and state agencies responsible for water and energy systems increasingly
rely on algorithm-assisted decision making to regulate these systems and
shepherd them through climate adaptation.2 Legal scholars, attorneys, and
1. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Christopher B. Fields
et al. eds., 2014).
2. See generally Deniz Özkundakci et. al., Building a Reliable Evidence Base Legal Challenges
in Environmental Decision-Making Call for a More Rigorous Adoption of Best Practices in Environmental
Modelling, 88 ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y 52, 52–62 (2018). Notably, over a decade ago, the National Research
Council published a report on how integral to the environmental regulatory process algorithmic tools had
become, calling computational models “essential element[s] of the environmental regulatory process.”
COMM. ON MODELS IN THE REGUL. DECISION PROCESS, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, MODELS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DECISION MAKING, at ix (2007), http://nap.edu/11972. A recent
partnership between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and University of British
Columbia makes the case for a “digital ecosystem for the planet” that would “connect individual data sets
with algorithms and analysis in order to create robust and timely environmental insights and intelligence.”
Jillian Campbell & David E. Jensen, The Promise and Peril of a Digital Ecosystem for the Planet, MEDIUM
(Sept. 11, 2019), https://medium.com/@davidedjensen_99356/building-a-digital-ecosystem-for-theplanet-557c41225dc2. The UNEP’s enthusiasm for new tools to support environmental decision making
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environmental equity advocates should care about this fundamental change in
governance for three reasons. First, climate adaptation necessarily depends on
these tools. They are not going away, and we need them. Second, algorithmic
tools are not policy neutral; rather they embed value-laden assumptions and
biases, which influence climate adaptation and law. And third, the “rules” of this
new kind of forum necessarily impede equity and democratic participation,
without deliberate countermeasures.
In this Article, I propose an initial step in the development of such
countermeasures: a framework for evaluating how algorithm-assisted decision
making, in environmental and energy regulation, influences law and what the
consequences are for equity and participation. This framework is designed to
bring to light embedded biases and values in algorithmic tools, open them up to
deliberation, and encourage broader coproduction of tools where possible. For
reasons discussed below, I believe that this framework is likely to be most useful
for advocacy groups, who already work on the behalf of marginalized
communities and the environment, in contexts where administrative bodies rely
on algorithmic tools.
This Article proceeds by first diagnosing the problem. Part I presents an
overview of how climate change disrupts existing water and energy systems, and
why algorithm-assisted decision-making tools are crucial to address these
disruptions. Part II examines the legal and environmental policy implications of
two key attributes of environmental and natural resource models. The first
attribute concerns algorithmic tools themselves—specifically, how, and whether,
existing law and policy are incorporated into these tools. The second attribute
has to do with the design process—how and whether stakeholders and end-users
collaborated in the tool’s development.
Building on these insights, in Part III this Article then presents a necessary
and foundational step to ameliorating the equity issues described earlier: a
framework for attorneys and advocates to evaluate equity in algorithmic-assisted
decision-making tools.
To illustrate the framework, Parts IV and V rely on two examples of energy
and water models: INFORM, a decision support tool used for reservoir
operations on the Sacramento River, and RESOLVE, an energy dispatch
optimization planning tool used by the California Public Utilities Commission

is understandable, as the world is beginning to face the cascading consequences of climate change.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2018 SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS in Global
Warming of 1.5°C An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the
global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty
3–26 (Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.Pörtner, D.Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A.Pirani, W.
Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X.Zhou, M.I.Gomis,
E.Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield eds., 2018); see also Fiona Harvey, IPCC Steps up
Warning on Climate Tipping Points in Leaked Draft Report, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2021, 12:34 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jun/23/climate-change-dangerous-thresholds-un-report.
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(CPUC).3 The comparison of these tools and their development indicates that
how law and policy are incorporated into algorithmic tools can influence the
development and regulation of climate adaptation, while inclusiveness and
collaboration during a tool’s development influences its perceived usefulness
and adoption. Both conclusions have implications for fairness and legitimacy of
environmental and natural resource planning.
I. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGES: ADAPTING WATER AND ENERGY SYSTEMS TO A
NEW CLIMATE
Before unpacking the role of algorithm-assisted decision-making tools in
water and energy systems, I provide some context for why regulators and
managers need these tools or find them helpful in a rapidly changing climate.
Freshwater systems in the United States are regulated, negotiated, and managed
to meet multiple, and at times conflicting, purposes.4 Even without considering
climate impacts, river basin governance is complex.5 Climate change exacerbates
many of the existing challenges to water governance by altering the quantity,
flow, and quality of available freshwater.6
Energy systems face a different set of challenges.7 Burning fossil fuels to
create electricity is a major source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, driving
climate change.8 As jurisdictions set targets to reduce GHG emissions, energy
generation systems are swapping out old fossil fuels for new renewable energy
and storage (batteries).9 The differences in how fossil fuels and renewable energy
3. The new framework in this Article builds on research from two prior studies by the author. The
first is a law review article that applies an institutional economics critique to how law and policy are
incorporated and represented in water resource models. Sonya F. P. Ziaja, Rules and Values in Virtual
Optimization of California Hydropower, 57 NAT. RES. J. 329 (2017). The second is a peer-reviewed, social
science publication that investigates the role of knowledge networks and boundary organizations in water
model development and adoption. Sonya F. Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks and Boundary
Organizations in Coproduction A Short History of a Decision-Support Tool and Model for Adapting
Multiuse Reservoir and Water-Energy Governance to Climate Change in California, 11 WEATHER,
CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 823 (2019).
4. See EDELLA SCHLAGER & WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, EMBRACING WATERSHED POLITICS 149–50
(2011); see also Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 826; SANDRA POSTEL & BRIAN
RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE (2003); Helen Ingram, Water
as a Multi-Dimensional Value Implications for Participation and Transparency, 6 INT’L ENV’T
AGREEMENTS: POL’Y, L., & ECON. 429, 429–33 (2006).
5. See SCHLAGER & BLOMQUIST, supra note 4, at 180.
6. See, e.g., Thomas Johnson et al., Water, in 2 FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT:
IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 147 (David Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf.
7. See generally CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT: STATEWIDE SUMMARY
REPORT 84 (2019), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/Statewide_Reports-SUMCCCA4-2018-013_Statewide_Summary_Report_ADA.pdf; see also 2 FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, at 76.
8. IPCC 2014, supra note 1, at 122.
9. See 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018);
see also THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: AN INITIATIVE OF E. STATES OF THE U.S.,
https://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
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generation produce electricity means that swapping energy sources is not as
simple as closing down a 150-megawatt coal plant and opening up a 150megawatt wind farm. Most renewable energy generation sources, like wind and
solar, are intermittent—the amount of energy they generate peaks and recedes
throughout the day—and play different roles on the grid (for example, ancillary
services, black start capability, etc.).10 Regulators and balancing authorities are
responsible for planning and managing the transition from fossil fuels to
renewables in a way that maintains grid reliability.11
These challenges, and the solutions offered by algorithm-assisted decision
making, are described in greater detail below.
A.

Water Systems and Climate

The Snoqualmie River in the Pacific Northwest serves as an example of the
challenges facing freshwater systems in the twenty-first century. Twenty-two
miles east of Seattle, there is a manmade fork in the Snoqualmie River.12 Water
at the fork is diverted from the main river and channeled into vertical penstocks,
dropping hundreds of feet below the ground to drive turbines that provide enough
electricity to power about 35,000 homes.13 Meanwhile, back on the main stem
of the river, about 150 feet after the fork, water cascades down 268 feet of granite,
sending mist upward.14 That mist is sacred to the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.15
The river itself is the home and breeding waters of Chinook salmon,16 a federally
endangered species17 and a key source of food for dwindling orca populations in

10. See, e.g., A. S. CHUANG & C. SCHWAEGERL, ANCILLARY SERVICES FOR RENEWABLE
INTEGRATION 1 (2009), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5211165.
11. See Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era, 109 CALIF. L.
REV. 209, 250 (2021).
12. See Snoqualmie Falls Hydroelectric Project, PUGET SOUND ENERGY, https://www.pse.com/en/
pages/facilities/snoqualmie-falls (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
13. Snoqualmie Falls has a generating capacity of fifty-three MW, between two turbines. Id. One
MW is enough to power roughly 400-900 homes. Bob Bellemare, What is a Megawatt., NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION (Feb, 24, 2012), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML120960701.pdf.
14. See Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.
2008); see also Jay Miller & Kenneth Tollefson, Snoqualmie Falls The First Traditional Cultural
Property in Washington State Listed in the National Register of Historic Places, 50 J. N.W.
ANTHROPOLOGY 67, 67–78 (2016).
15. See Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, 545 F.3d at 1211; see also Miller & Tollefson, supra note 14, at
67–78.
16. See ETHAN SEAY & MATTHEW POULEY, TULALIP TRIBES NAT. RES. DEP’T, SNOQUALMIE
RIVER JUVENILE SALMON OUT-MIGRATION STUDY PROGRESS REPORT 3
(2019),
https://nr.tulaliptribes.com/Base/File/SNOQUALMIE-RIVER-JUVENILE-SALMON-OUTMIGRATION=-STUDY-PROGRESS-REPORT-2019; see also JOSH KUBO ET AL., TULALIP TRIBES
NAT. RES. DEP’T, 2000-2012 SKYKOMISH AND SNOQUALMIE RIVERS CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON OUTMIGRATION STUDY 1–13 (2013), https://nr.tulaliptribes.com/Content/documents/Tulalip-SkykomishSnoqualmie-Outmigrant-Study-2013.pdf.
17. Chinook Salmon (Protected), NOAA FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/
chinook-salmon-protected (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
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Puget Sound.18 These uses of the river—power, religion, habitat, and
conservation—are in addition to drinking water, agricultural, and recreational
uses, all of which are subject to state and federal agency regulation.19
Climate change alters water quantity and quality, limiting the water
available for multiple uses, from headwaters to delta.20 For example, increased
ambient temperatures associated with climate change lead to warmer streams,
decreased snowpack, and more prominent atmospheric rivers.21 Warmer instream temperatures in turn decrease the amount of dissolved oxygen available
to support healthy fish and amphibians.22 More prominent atmospheric rivers in
the sky combined with decreased snowpack in the mountains lead to changes in
turbidity and increased risk of floods, while changing the seasonal availability of
water for hydropower generation.23 And, at the delta, sea level rise threatens
riparian habitat with salt water intrusion.24
For some uses, water conflicts are zero-sum. More water diverted to
hydroelectric power, for example, means less mist at the falls for religious
purposes. Climate impacts on river systems exacerbate the inherent tensions in
these tradeoffs. Resolving conflicts among these uses falls to litigation, as it did
in the case of Snoqualmie Falls.25 Litigation and the courts, however, are not the
sole mechanisms for addressing water conflicts. Negotiation and agency
regulation can prevent, or minimize, future conflicts among uses, which in turn,
rely heavily on software assistance to create an array of scenarios to guide
decision making.26

18. Samuel K. Wasser et al., Population Growth is Limited by Nutritional Impacts on Pregnancy
Success in Endangered Southern Resident Killer Whales (Orcinus Orca), PLOS ONE, June 2017, at 1–2.
19. See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 824.
20. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 152–54.
21. N. Goldenson et al., Influence of Atmospheric Rivers on Mountain Snowpack in the Western
United States, 31 J. CLIMATE, 9921 (2018); Ashley E. Payne et al., Responses and Impacts of Atmospheric
Rivers to Climate Change, 1 NAT. REVS.: EARTH & ENV’T 143, 149 (2020).
22. Sarah E. Null et al., Dissolved Oxygen, Stream Temperature, and Fish Habitat Response to
Environmental Water Purchases, 197 J. ENV’T MGMT. 559, 568 (2017); see generally Darren L. Ficklin
et al., Effects of Climate Change on Stream Temperature, Dissolved Oxygen, and Sediment Concentration
in the Sierra Nevada in California, 49 WATER RES. RSCH. 2765 (2013).
23. Julie A. Vano et al., Climate Change Impacts on Water Management in the Puget Sound Region,
Washington State, USA, 102 CLIMATIC CHANGE 261 (2010).
24. Paul Stanton Kibel, Sea Level Rise, Saltwater Intrusion and Endangered Fisheries – Shifting
Baselines for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan, 38 ENVIRONS: ENV’T L. & POL’Y J. 259 (2015).
25. See Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.
2008); see also Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 329–36.
26. See, e.g., COMM. ON MODELS IN THE REGUL. DECISION PROCESS, supra note 3, at ix (“The use
of computational models is an essential element of the environmental regulatory process.”); Ziaja, supra
note 9, at 833 tbl.2; Özkundakci et al., supra note 2; Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3; Wendy Wagner
et al., Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J.
293 (2010); Marcela Brugnach et al., Uncertainty Matters Computer Models at the Science-Policy
Interface, 21 WATER RES. MGMT. 1075 (2007).
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Energy Systems and Climate

For most people, energy systems function in the background. People worry
about paying their energy bills, and maybe they consider what kind of power
plant generates the electricity they consume. Otherwise, as long as the lights turn
on, how energy systems function is generally not a matter of day-to-day concern
to the public. Behind the scenes, making certain that there is sufficient, but not
too much, electricity produced to meet demand is a major concern for utilities,
regulators, and balancing authorities.27 A fundamental maxim of electricity
service is that energy supply must always meet demand.28 This is the heart of
keeping the lights on. Having sufficient energy resources to meet projected
demand is called “resource adequacy.”29 The grid must also have sufficient
flexibility (part of “ancillary services” to the grid) to ramp up production if
demand peaks and to ramp down if demand suddenly drops.30 As discussed
above, different energy generation sources have varying attributes that make
them more or less able to provide that flexibility to the grid.
Multiple organizations and institutions are responsible for making sure
there is sufficient generation of the right mix to provide flexibility and resource
adequacy on long- and short-term bases. Federally-regulated balancing
authorities are responsible for ensuring overall resource adequacy for the
nation’s grids, with the exception of Texas’s grid, which is operated by its own
regional balancing authority.31 Individual utilities and energy providers
participate in energy markets to buy and sell energy generation and to meet
demand or shed load.32 And state commissions, which oversee investor-owned
utilities, can mandate specific resource adequacy requirements for regulated
utilities.33

27. For an accessible overview of the electricity grid, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
MAINTAINING RELIABILITY IN THE MODERN POWER SYSTEM (2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract
&did=806857, and How the Electricity Grid Works, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/how-electricity-grid-works. For a more in depth, but still accessible,
overview, see generally GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN AMERICANS AND
OUR ENERGY FUTURE (2016).
28. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 27, at 1, 6.
29. See Welton, supra note 11, at 231; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 27, at 6.
30. Giulia De Zotti et al., Ancillary Services 4.0 A Top-to-Bottom Control-Based Approach for
Solving Ancillary Services Problems in Smart Grids, 6 IEEE ACCESS 11,694, 11,695 (2018),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8290690. For a discussion of ancillary service
markets in the United States, see generally Helen Aki, Note, Better than Net Benefits Rethinking the
FERC v. EPSA Test to Maximize Value in Grid-Edge Electricity Markets, 44 ECOLOGY L. Q. 419 (2020).
31. Sara Hoff, U.S. Electric System is Made Up of Interconnections and Balancing Authorities, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (July 20, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27152. For a
detailed assessment of RTOs, see Welton, supra note 11, at 225.
32. See, e.g., Sarah M. Main, Dual Environmentalism Demand Response Mechanisms in Wholesale
and Retail Energy Markets, 34 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 165, 187 (2016).
33. See Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing How Regional Electricity
Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 106 (2018).
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Weather and climate influence the grid characteristics needed to fulfill
resource adequacy.34 Demand for heating, for example, is quantified in “heating
degree days”—the amount of energy needed to heat a building when the outside
temperature drops below a certain point, usually about forty degrees
Fahrenheit.35 Similarly, demand for cooling is quantified as “cooling degree
days”—the amount of energy needed to cool a building when the outside
temperature is above a certain point.36
Typically, popular writing and scholarship characterizes the energy
system’s relation to climate change as a source of GHGs (such as from fossil fuel
energy generation) or a solution to curbing emissions (such as through switching
to renewable energy generation).37 But, the energy system itself is also
vulnerable to climate impacts.38 Increases in temperature boost total demand for
energy, while reducing the efficiency of energy generation and transmission—
raising the costs of electricity production.39 Decreased snow accumulation in the
mountainous regions of the world limits the availability of hydropower—one of
the few generation sources that provides robust ancillary services to the electrical
grid.40 And, the spread of massive wildfires throughout the western United States
threatens the availability of electricity, as utilities limit their liability by curtailing
services.41
C.

What Do Algorithms and Modeling Have to Do with This All?

First, a few definitions. How we talk about the analytic software tools that
inform policy has changed over time. Algorithms and “algorithmic decisionmaking”42 (ADM) are discussed and debated far more now than even a decade
ago, especially regarding the application of ADM to policing and surveillance.43
In layman’s terms, an algorithm is a sequential process of calculations—or more
34. Craig D. Zamuda et al., Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand, in 2 FOURTH NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, at 196.
35. For more information about heating degree days and cooling degree days, see Units and
Calculators Explained Degree Days, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 23, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/units-and-calculators/degree-days.php.
36. Id.
37. Zamuda et al., supra note 34.
38. See id. at 175.
39. Id. at 176.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973
(2016).
43. See, e.g., Bruno Lepri et al., Fair, Transparent, and Accountable Algorithmic Decision-Making
Processes, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 611 (2018); see also Katharina A. Zweig et al., On Chances and Risks of
Security Related Algorithmic Decision Making Systems, 3 EUR. J. FOR SEC. RSCH. 181, 181–203 (2018);
Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 103, 146–50 (2018). See generally David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic
Accountability in the Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 800 (2020); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity
in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L. J. 1043 (2019).
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simply, what the programmer instructs a computer to do with data.44 The term
“algorithm” is frequently mistakenly conflated with “machine-learning.”45 Not
all algorithms lead to machine learning or artificial intelligence, though machine
learning necessarily requires algorithms.46 Computer models of climate systems,
social-economic-environmental systems, and energy grid expansion also require
algorithms to function. These software products and models may represent
existing conditions (simulation models),47 or solve for least-cost policy options
(optimization models),48 among others.
To refocus our attention on broader policy processes, this Article uses the
term algorithm-assisted decision making, which includes, but is not exclusive to,
ADM. The important distinction here is the presumed role of humans in decision
making. ADM is frequently discussed as though the program makes decisions
apart from human intervention or systems,49 whereas algorithm-assisted decision
making recognizes the place of technology within human systems and does not
focus solely on machine learning. Thus, this Article’s examination of algorithmassisted decision making includes computational models and decision support
software.
What these analytic tools have in common is a process of collecting and
organizing data, representing relationships among the data, and analyzing those
relationships to answer a question. This process relies on quantification to
represent the reality of complex environmental systems.50 For example, a model
used for river basin planning might assign numerical values for species
protection, to be weighed against numerical values for hydroelectric
generation.51
Energy regulators and utilities already rely heavily on algorithm-assisted
decision making. At the national level, the recently passed Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 directs the Energy Information Administration
to make revisions and upgrades to the National Energy Modeling System,
including “greater flexibility in the modeling of environmental impacts”
44. See generally Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2014); Harry
Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law An Overview, 35 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 1319 (2019).
45. See generally Surden, Machine Learning and Law, supra note 44; Surden, Artificial Intelligence
and Law An Overview, supra note 44, at 1316; see also Leo Hickman, How Algorithms Rule the World,
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2013, 1:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jul/01/how-algorithmsrule-world-nsa.
46. For a quick and accessible overview of algorithms and artificial intelligence, see Stephen F.
Deangelis, Artificial Intelligence How Algorithms Make Systems Smart, WIRED, https://www.wired.com
/insights/2014/09/artificial-intelligence-algorithms-2/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2021). For a thorough cultural
history of algorithms, see generally PAOLO ZELLINI, THE MATHEMATICS OF THE GODS AND THE
ALGORITHMS OF MEN: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2020).
47. See Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 45 UTAH
L. REV. 219, 245 (2013).
48. Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 331.
49. See, e.g., Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law An Overview, supra note 44.
50. See generally Linda Pilkey-Jarvis & Orrin H. Pilkey, Useless Arithmetic Ten Points to Ponder
When Using Mathematical Models in Environmental Decision Making, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 470 (2008).
51. See Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 332–33, 353–55.
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including GHG emissions and “the use of land and water resources” along with
“the ability to support climate modeling.”52 And, these kinds of tools are
becoming increasingly common in water governance and environmental
planning. Climate change has increased the complexity of making decisions for
water and energy planning, leading regulators to rely more heavily on
algorithmic tools. Climate change has also raised the stakes of decision making
in these domains—which makes it all the more critical to better understand how
algorithmic tools operate, their role in governance, and their implications for
equity and democratic participation.
II. MULTIDISCIPLINARY LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE
OF ALGORITHM-ASSISTED DECISION MAKING IN GOVERNANCE
The discussion above describes how algorithmic tools can be useful, if not
critical, to climate adaptation. But how do such tools interact with law and
policy? Scholarship on the role of algorithm-assisted decision making in law and
public policy generally falls into two camps. Let’s call these the rational
enlightenment camp53 and the realist camp.54
The rational enlightenment camp says something like, the problem with
models is that policymakers aren’t using them enough, or the models are
misunderstood as irrelevant.55 This literature argues that the ability of
mathematical modeling to simplify complex, complicated, or otherwise

52. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021§ 40417 (11)(A), (B).
53. Stephen H. Schneider, Integrated Assessment Modeling of Global Climate Change Transparent
Rational Tool for Policy Making or Opaque Screen Hiding Value-Laden Assumptions?, 2 ENV’T
MODELING & ASSESSMENT 229, 229 (1997) (examining the “analytic tools that analysts often turn to in
search for rational enlightenment in the bewilderingly complex global climate change policy debate:
integrated assessment models (IAMs)”).
54. For the sake of simplicity, I describe the literature in terms of separate camps, rather than a
spectrum. Of course, the reality is more nuanced and variable. Individual scholars can and do write from
multiple perspectives. Compare James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy Conflicts
between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901 (2005)
with Owen, supra note 47.
55. See Amy L. Stein, Artificial Intelligence and Climate Change, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 890, 890–
939 (2020); see Owen, supra note 47, at 278–79 (arguing for environmental law to engage with simulation
models, especially spatial analysis models, to become less fragmented across subject matter and territorial
jurisdiction.); see generally Brugnach et al., Uncertainty Matters, supra note 26, at 1075–90; see also
Lorène Prost et al., Lack of Consideration for End-Users During the Design of Agronomic Models. A
Review, 32 AGRONOMY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 581, 581–94 (2012); see also Steve Rayner et al.,
Weather Forecasts Are for Wimps Why Water Resource Managers Do Not Use Climate Forecasts, 69
CLIMATIC CHANGE 197, 197–227 (2005).
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“wicked”56 problems (such as electricity grid planning,57 allocating water for
multiple uses,58 or fisheries management59) and provide a suite of scenarios for
different management options60 gives decision makers an edge in adjusting
governance to climate impacts.61 Scholarship here has investigated the models
themselves,62 the failure to consider end-users in the modeling process,63 and the
culture of potential end-users64 as the cause of the disconnect.
The realist camp says something like, the problem with models is that
policymakers believe them too much. In other words, the models are misleading
or misinterpreted.65 This literature argues that policymakers ask too much from
models, considering them to be “truth machines,”66 “answer machines,”67 and
maintain “ingrained myths that models can yield ‘objective evidence’ or
‘straightforward policy solutions’ . . . .”68 Scholarship in this camp also raises
the concern that policymakers may use models as a fig leaf69 to obscure70 or
avoid making71 politically difficult choices.

56. Cynthia H. Stahl, Out of the Land of Oz the importance of tackling wicked environmental
problems without taming them, 34 ENV’T SYS. & DECISIONS 473, 474 (2014); Heather J. Aslin & Kirsty
L. Blackstock, Now I’m Not an Expert in Anything’ Challenges in Undertaking Transdisciplinary
Inquiries Across the Social and Biophysical Sciences, in TACKLING WICKED PROBLEMS: THROUGH THE
TRANSDISCIPLINARY IMAGINATION 117 (Valerie A. Brown et al. eds., 2010).
57. See generally Rodrigo Moreno et al., Planning Low-Carbon Electricity Systems Under
Uncertainty Considering Operational Flexibility and Smart Grid Technologies, 375 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC’Y 1 (2017).
58. See, e.g., JAY R. LUND ET AL., WATER MANAGEMENT LESSONS FOR CALIFORNIA FROM
STATEWIDE HYDRO-ECONOMIC MODELING USING THE CALVIN MODEL (2009), https://watershed.
ucdavis.edu/shed/lund/CALVIN/ProjectHandoutNew.pdf.
59. See id.
60. See DAVID ROLAND-HOLST ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CEC-500-2018-013, EXPLORING
ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN LONG-TERM CALIFORNIA ENERGY SCENARIOS (2018); Anthony L. Westerling et
al., Climate Change and Growth Scenarios for California Wildfire, 109 CLIMATIC CHANGE 445, 451–44
(2011); see also MAX WEI ET AL., SCENARIOS FOR MEETING CALIFORNIA’S 2050 CLIMATE GOALS:
CALIFORNIA’S CARBON CHALLENGE PHASE II VOLUME I: NON-ELECTRICITY SECTORS AND OVERALL
SCENARIO RESULTS, at iv (2014).
61. Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3. UNEP’s argument for a planetary “digital ecosystem”
falls solidly in this camp. Campbell & Jensen, supra note 2.
62. See generally Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3.
63. See generally Prost et al., supra note 51; Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3; see also
Brugnach et al., supra note 26, at 1078; Ingram, supra note 4, at 429–33.
64. Rayner et al., supra note 55.
65. See generally Wagner et al., supra note 26; see also Pilkey-Jarvis & Pilkey, supra note 50, at
472.
66. Brian Wynne & Simon Shackley, Environmental Models Truth Machines of Social Heuristics?,
21 GLOBE: REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’ETUDES QUEBECOISES 6, 6–8 (1994).
67. Wagner et al., supra note 26, at 293, 295.
68. Anne van Bruggen et al., Modeling with Stakeholders for Transformative Change,
SUSTAINABILITY, Feb. 2019, at 6.
69. See Pilkey-Jarvis & Pilkey, Decision Making, supra note 50, at 475–76.
70. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 43, at 119 (“The idea that algorithms are a science without
politics can obscure the stakes of their private control that are clearer in other areas of privatization, such
as schools and prisons.”).
71. See Wagner et al., supra note 26; but cf. Rayner et al., supra note 55, at 222.
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The rational enlightenment camp and realist camp have much in common.
They both point to a disconnect between what policymakers think about models
and what models are. They also both argue that addressing either problem
requires confronting uncertainty inherent in models, stakeholder participation,
and transparency.
The use of algorithm-assisted decision making in security, policing, and
finance dominates current scholarship on machine-assisted decision making.72
But, it was environmental scholarship, especially on Integrated Assessment
Modeling (IAM)—commonly used, for example, in global or national climate
assessments—which was among the first to point out the disconnect between
policymaking and modeling, and to posit solutions for bridging that gap.73
Stephen Schneider, a founding father of modern climate science and climate
communication, summarized the modeling-policy problem in a 1997 paper.74 He
72. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 22, 22
(2018); Huq, supra note 43.
73. See generally Edward A. Parson, Integrated Assessment and Environmental Policy Making In
Pursuit of Usefulness, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 463 (1995); see also Edward A. Parson, Three Dilemmas in the
Integrated Assessment of Climatic Change An Editorial Comment, 34 CLIMATIC CHANGE 315, 321–24
(1996); Diana M. Liverman, Forecasting the Impact of Climate on Food Systems Model Testing and
Model Linkage, 11 CLIMATIC CHANGE 267 (1987); Wynne & Shackley, supra note 66, at 6–8; Marjolein
B. A. van Asselt & Jan Rotmans, Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment Modelling From Positivism to
Pluralism, 54 CLIMATIC CHANGE 75 (2002). Wendy Wagner has published numerous articles on the
complicated relationship between policymaking and scientific information (especially modeling). See,
e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1614
(1995) (writing, even then, that “[r]educed public participation, excessive regulatory delays, and the
incomplete and inaccurate incorporation of science have plagued science-based environmental regulation
for nearly three decades”); Wagner et al., supra note 26 (arguing that policymakers need to go beyond
viewing computational models as “answer machines” or “truth machines”); Wendy E. Wagner & Martin
Murillo, Is the Administrative State Ready for Big Data? Exploring the Accountability Challenges in
Environmental and Public Health Regulation, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Colum. Univ. (Apr. 30,
2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/is-the-administrative-state-ready-for-big-data. There is also a
rich literature on the related topic of the legitimacy of cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) in environmental law
policymaking. An intrinsic attribute of both CBAs and algorithm-assisted decision making is that both
rely on simplifications. The choices of how to simplify necessarily influence outcomes and obscure
political choices. They differ, however, in complexity and legibility even among technocrats. Unraveling
the connection between CBAs and algorithm-assisted decision making is deserving of its own article, and
beyond the scope of this one. But, for those interested in the topic, see generally MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE
& RICHARD L. REVESZ, REVIVING RATIONALITY: SAVING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR THE SAKE OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2021); Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 2015.1 UTAH L. REV. 93 (2015); Giulia Wegner & Unai Pascual, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the
Context of Ecosystem Services for Human Well-Being A Multidisciplinary Critique, 21 GLOB. ENV’T
CHANGE 492 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENV’T
L. REV. 1 (2017). For a very short case study of the steep challenges of creating defensible CBAs for
endangered species, see Norman K. Whittlesey & Phillip R. Wandshneider, Salmon Recovery As Viewed
by Two Economists, 7 CHOICES: MAG. FOOD, FARM, & RES. ISSUES 3, 5 (1992) (“[I]n our society, issues
such as endangered species are often decided with valuations inconsistent with the calculus of tradeoffs
that economists employ. Fair treatment and moral obligation cannot be incorporated into the economic
analyses.”).
74. See generally Schneider, supra note 53. Notably, Dave Owen and James Fine trace the tension
between modeling and participation even further in caselaw. See Fine & Owen, supra note 54, at 914–15
(citing to Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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argued that IAM was intended to be, and should be, a useful tool for
policymakers to govern the environment.75 For Schneider, IAM would make
decision making “more rational,” even if not completely so.76 But, Schneider
argues, because environmental models are necessarily complex and contain
“value-laden assumptions,” they can “obscure values or make implicit cultural
assumptions about how nature or society works (or the modelers’ beliefs about
how they ‘should’ work)” and “diminish the openness of the decision-making
process,” making it “less rational.”77 Schneider proposed a means to express
uncertainty in modeling results, arguing that modelers had a “special obligation
to make . . . tools transparent as possible,”78 and “[m]ost critical . . . to engage in
a vigorous outreach program to entrain decision-makers and citizens at all levels
into the process of helping to design, test, and use IAMs for real policy
questions.”79 In Schneider’s view, failing to address sources that allow
unchecked value-laden assumptions to persist would “make IAMs at best
irrelevant to policy-makers, and at worst, misleading.”80
From Schneider’s work, we can then derive three diagnostic categories to
address the concerns of both the rational enlightenment and realist camps:
uncertainty, transparency, and stakeholder collaboration. A discussion of each
follows.
A.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty is a key feature of most environmental models, but may not be
readily apparent in the model outputs or its code. Wilson explains that many
environmental systems, like watersheds or fisheries, are complex adaptive
systems81—where underlying cause-and-effect relationships may not be known
or even knowable. This is called system uncertainty or “model uncertainty.”82
Using a “reductionist approach” simplifies the system structure, which conceals
the underlying system uncertainty.83 Schlager and Blomquist build on Wilson’s
observations, arguing that “[i]n the effort to manage and protect complex
adaptive systems, failure to recognize and acknowledge uncertainty can magnify

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Schneider, supra note 53.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 246.
See Bobbi Low et al., Redundancy and Diversity Do They Influence Optimal Management?, in
NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE 83,
103 (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 2002) (describing complex adaptive systems as being “composed of a large
number of active elements whose rich patterns of interactions produce emergent properties–which are not
easy to predict by analyzing the separate system components”).
82. James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the Design of Common-Pool
Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 327, 333 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002); see also Fine &
Owen, supra note 54, at 922–26 (discussing sources of uncertainty in simulation models).
83. Wilson, supra note 82, at 328.
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the error proneness of management effects.”84 Brauneis and Goodman put an
even finer point on the problem of uncertainty in modeling, albeit in a different
context,85 stating:
[t]he risk is that the opacity of the algorithm enables [ . . . ] capture of public
power. When a government agent implements an algorithmic
recommendation that she does not understand and cannot explain, the
government has lost democratic accountability, the public cannot assess the
efficacy and fairness of the governmental process, and the government agent
has lost competence to do the public’s work in any kind of critical fashion.86
Uncertainty then is not just a matter of needing further scientific study—it is a
matter of communication and the capacity to understand.
Scholarship on environmental modeling in decision making has consistently
argued that modelers should be explicit about model uncertainty.87 Solutions for
resolving or clarifying uncertainty tend to rely on increased stakeholder
involvement in the modeling process,88 or greater forthrightness about
uncertainty on the part of modelers.89 Brugnach and others argue that by doing
both, projects are able to build capacity among decision makers to understand
the model and build trust between modelers and stakeholders.90
B.

Transparency

Legal approaches to the problems of algorithm-assisted decision making
have focused on transparency as a solution.91 The European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for example, famously includes a “right to
an explanation” regarding algorithmic decision making.92 Legal scholarship
closer to home likewise stresses transparency in algorithm-assisted decision
making.93 A recent examination of predictive algorithms used in local
84.
85.
86.
87.

SCHLAGER & BLOMQUIST, EMBRACING WATERSHED POLITICS, supra note 4, at 149–50.
Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 43, at 109 (examining the use of ADM in policing).
Id.
van Asselt & Rotmans, supra note 73, at 108; see generally Schneider, supra note 53; see also
Brugnach et al., supra note 26, at 1082.
88. See, e.g., Brugnach et al., supra note 26.
89. Wagner et al., supra note 26, at 7 (both participation and transparency); see also Özkundakci et
al., supra note 2, at 61 (“[I]f models are to be of substantial help in environmental and resource
management decision-making, then modellers and decision-makers will need to ensure that there is a clear
understanding of the purpose of a model, the modelling process is transparent, and that best practice
guidelines are followed.”). See generally, John Bistline et al., Deepening Transparency About ValueLaden Assumptions in Energy and Environmental Modelling Improving Best Practices for Both
Modellers and Non-Modellers, 21 CLIMATE POL’Y 1 (2020) (arguing that interdisciplinary collaboration
is needed to unearth and openly discuss hidden “value-laden” assumptions in environmental and energy
models).
90. See Brugnach et al., supra note 26, at 1082.
91. See Sandra Wachter, The GDPR and the Internet of Things A Three-Step Transparency Model,
10 L., INNOVATION & TECH. 266, 280 (2018).
92. See Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a Right to an Explanation’
Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 20 (2017).
93. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 43, at 109; see also Engstrom & Ho, supra note 43, at 15.
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governance to allocate resources concludes that “[p]ublic entity contracts should
require vendors to create and deliver records that explain key policy decisions
and validation efforts, without necessarily disclosing precise formulas or
algorithms.”94
However, there are significant doubts as to whether transparency alone is
sufficient to overcome obfuscation, especially algorithm-assisted decision
making’s obfuscation of uncertainty and associated “value-laden” assumptions.
Many, if not most, environmental models and software include a descriptive
model process manual, which describes the model’s structure, calibration, and
data, and generally how the model works. But, this does not necessarily make
the model accessible to non-engineering audiences.95
Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford in particular interrogate whether
transparency is sufficient to have accountability of algorithmic-assisted decision
making in government, concluding that “transparency is an inadequate way to
understand—much less govern—algorithms.”96 Similarly, in a critique of the
GDPR’s reliance on transparency as an oversight mechanism, Lilian Edwards
and Michael Veale note that in complex and complicated systems, transparency
is unlikely to lead to understanding or oversight.97 This is because “the
explanation itself may not be meaningful enough to confer much autonomy even
on the most empowered data subject” and “[i]ndividuals are mostly too timepoor, resource-poor, and lacking in the necessary expertise to meaningfully make
use of these individual rights.”98 To put this another way, transparency tends to
provide detail, not clarity.
C.

Stakeholder Collaboration

It is said in political science that “[p]olitics is not only ‘who gets what,
when, and how’ . . . [i]t is also who decides who gets what, when, and how, and
how we decide such things.”99 With this definition in mind, algorithmic tools are
political machines—allocating resources according to internal rules (who gets
what, when, and how). That is only half of the story, though; it is necessary to
look beyond what the outputs of a particular model are to who developed the
model, and how decisions were made in its development. Ananny and Crawford
note that:

94. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 43, at 176.
95. For example, see U.S. EPA’s model documentation for the SAGE model of the U.S. economy
for environmental planning. A. Marten, A. A. Schreiber, & A. Wolverton, SAGE Model Documentation
(2.0.1), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/cge-modeling-regulatory-analysis (last
visited Jan. 4, 2022).
96. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 42, at 983.
97. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 92, at 67.
98. Id.
99. SCHLAGER & BLOMQUIST, EMBRACING WATERSHED POLITICS, supra note 4, at 149–50.
(quoting HAROLD LESSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1936)).
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[a]n algorithmic system is not just code and data but an assemblage of human
and non-human actors—of ‘institutionally situated code, practices, and
norms with the power to create, sustain, and signify relationships among
people and data through minimally observable, semiautonomous action.’
This requires going beyond ‘algorithms as fetishized objects’ to take better
account of the human scenes where algorithms, code, and platforms
intersect.100
In other words, for algorithm-assisted decision making, the process of
development is part of the system.
Schneider proposed stakeholder collaboration as important to the future of
environmental modeling.101 He called for the “increased involvement of diverse
policy actors in the development and use of assessments and assessment
tools . . . .”102 He also noted that while calling for stakeholder involvement was
obvious, how to do it was less so.103
Bistline and colleagues argue that interdisciplinary collaboration is needed
to unearth and openly discuss hidden value-laden assumptions in environmental
and energy models; for example, which discount rate is used in cost-benefit
analyses has implications for intergenerational equity.104 Similarly, Wagner and
colleagues point out that environmental decision makers fail to understand, or
investigate, underlying assumptions and uncertainties in the models.105 They
recommend changing administrative rules to encourage stakeholder participation
in model oversight and for modelers to be explicit about assumptions and
uncertainty.106
Existing literature does not agree on the appropriate timing and extent of
stakeholder collaboration for model development. Much of the literature
maintains that stakeholder collaboration should occur throughout the modeling
process.107 Uncertainty in models should be assessed throughout the model

100. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 42, at 983 (first quoting Mike Ananny, Toward an Ethics of
Algorithms Convening, Observation, Probability, and Timeliness, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 93,
93 (2016), then quoting Kate Crawford, Can an Algorithm Be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in
Calculated Publics, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 77, 89 (2016)).
101. Schneider, supra note 53, at 235.
102. Id. (quoting Edward A. Parson, Three Dilemmas in the Integrated Assessment of Climate
Change An Editorial Comment, 34 CLIMATIC CHANGE 315, 324 (1996)).
103. Id. (“[H]ow do we cajole such a diverse set of policy actors and social agents to set aside their
agendas, prejudices and fears to even look at complex analytical tools like IAM? Moreover, how can we
help them to overcome the initial effort barrier to their getting started in discovering – and using –
IAMs?”).
104. See Bistline et al., supra note 89, at 1.
105. See generally Wagner et al., supra note 26.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Katharine J. Mach et al., Actionable Knowledge and the Art of Engagement, 42
CURRENT OP. ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY 30, 32–33 (2020); Jens Christian Refsgaard et al., Uncertainty in
the Environmental Modelling Process – A Framework and Guidance, 22 ENV’T MODELLING &
SOFTWARE 1543, 1544–45 (2007); Susanne C. Moser, Can Science on Transformation Transform
Science? Lessons from Co-Design, 20 CURRENT OP. ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY 106, 111–12 (2016).
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development process “from the very beginning,”108 in collaboration with end
users and stakeholders. The argument, generally, is that by including
stakeholders from the start—codesigning109 decision support tools—the end
product will have improved legitimacy, credibility, and salience.110 However, a
recent longitudinal study of water governance modeling illustrates that even
successful collaborative environmental, algorithm-assisted decision making can
have extended periods of time where no collaboration took place, and that those
periods may be critical to the success of the project.111
D.

Implications for Substantive and Procedural Equity across Uncertainty,
Transparency, and Stakeholder Collaboration

Value-laden assumptions in decision making are inextricably tied to
questions of substantive and procedural equity. Before digging into this point,
however, it is important to clarify what I mean by equity and how it relates to
democratic participation in this Article.112
Equity is becoming prominent in contemporary climate and environmental
scholarship.113 There is broad agreement across environmental and energy
studies that “equity” denotes fairness or justice.114 But, systematic reviews of
conservation literature, for example, demonstrate there is not a consistent
definition of equity, such that it is not possible to compare across studies of
equity in conservation.115 There is no broadly agreed upon framework for
“knowing equity when we see it.”116 Absent an agreed upon definition of equity
in environmental and energy scholarship, I draw on definitions from the fields of
public affairs and public policy.
In these fields, equity is a distribution problem.117 What a fair or just
distribution of rights, duties, or resources is may not always mean equal

108. See Refsgaard et al., supra note 107, at 1543.
109. See Moser, supra note 107, at 113.
110. David W. Cash et al., Knowledge Systems for Sustainable Development, 100 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. 8086, 8086 (2003).
111. Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3.
112. For an assessment of what scholars mean by “equity” in subfields of environmental policy, see
generally Rachel S. Friedman et al., How Just and Just How? A Systematic Review of Social Equity in
Conservation Research, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Apr. 2018.
113. See Frank Biermann & Agni Kalfagianni, Planetary Justice A Research Framework, EARTH
SYS. GOVERNANCE, Dec. 2020, at 1.
114. See, e.g., id. at 2–3; Friedman et al., supra note 112, at 3.
115. See generally Biermann & Kalfagianni, supra note 113; Friedman et al., supra note 112. For a
summary of what justice and equity mean in the energy context, see generally Sanya Carley & David M.
Konisky, The Justice and Equity Implications of the Clean Energy Transition, 5 NATURE ENERGY 569
(2020).
116. Margaret Wilder & Helen Ingram, Knowing Equity When We See It Water Equity in
Contemporary Global Contexts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WATER POLITICS AND POLICY 49 (Ken
Conca & Erika Weinthal eds., 2016).
117. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 39–60
(1997); H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, SOCIAL EQUITY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: ORIGINS,
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proportions across recipients.118 For example, giving equal slices of cake to a
class may be unfair or inequitable, if only a portion of the class contributed to
making the cake and the other portion tried to sabotage the oven.119 As one might
imagine from even this simplistic example, there are earnest differences in
opinion about what should constitute equitable distribution.120
In a democracy, choices among competing visions of equity are political
dilemmas,121 subject to deliberation.122 Deliberation depends on participation
(who is part of the conversation)123 and accessibility (whether interested groups
and individuals have access to the deliberative forum and subject matter).124 For
law in a modern democracy to be legitimate, and for deliberation to be
meaningful, people need to see themselves in the law and the process behind it;
or as Habermas put it, they need to perceive themselves as “authors.”125 As I
argue in this article, the nature of algorithmic tools and the typical design process
of such tools frustrates participation in and accessibility of deliberation—
obscuring questions of equity.
Value-laden assumptions inherent in algorithm-assisted decision making
can act as a barrier to equity. For example, consider Wilder and Ingram’s concept
of equity, developed in their 2016 synthesis of principles of equity in water
governance.126 They note that “[equity requires] engaging in a process of critical
inquiry that delves into the value bias of existing institutions and processes, the
openness and accessibility of political arenas, an appraisal of what and who is
being served by water related decisions, and what and who may be left out.”127
In traditional governance institutions—for example, courts, legislatures, and
collaboratives—what Wilder and Ingram propose is challenging, but not
DEVELOPMENTS, AND APPLICATIONS 12–13 (2010); Mary E. Guy & Sean A. McCandless, Social Equity
Its Legacy, Its Promise, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. s5, s5 (2012).
118. See STONE, supra note 117, at Chapter 3.
119. Deborah Stone lays out eight challenges to equality (“same size share for everybody”) using a
brilliant chocolate cake analogy to unpack the dimensions of equity, Nozick, and Rawls. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 39; DANIEL BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE
MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 16 (2010) (“In democratic states, these declarations of what must
(or ought to) be done emanate from the judicial and parliamentary branches of government. That is, after
all, the reason why these branches of government exist. It is in the discourses of parliaments—and the
considerations of the courts—that debates about the relative merits of Y and ~Y take place. Although
Paretian economists may feel uncomfortable at the prospect of making choices without prices (and thus
without monetary estimates of ∑$VY), this is a misplaced concern. Democratic structures and processes
exist for precisely those purposes.” (internal citations omitted)).
122. See BROMLEY, supra note 121, at 31–42.
123. See Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 216, 220
(1969).
124. Jonathon Skinner Thompson, Procedural Environmental Justice, 96 WASH. L. REV.__
(forthcoming 2022).
125. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 33 (1992) (“[M]odern law lives off a solidarity concentrated in the value
orientations of citizens and ultimately issuing from communicative action deliberation.”).
126. See Wilder & Ingram, supra note 116.
127. Id. at 11.
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impossible.128 Advocates and activists may readily perceive and counter
deliberately hurtful assumptions, or dog whistles, and inadvertent assumptions
in natural language. By contrast, with few exceptions,129 uncovering,
understanding, and addressing similar assumptions in algorithm-assisted
decision making is more difficult.
A careful reader may be asking themselves, “Isn’t equity in algorithmassisted decision making just a question of getting the inputs right?” Dear reader,
you are not alone. For some kinds of algorithm-assisted decision making—like
screening decisions—models are particularly sensitive to inputs and training
data.130 Even in energy and environmental models, the choice of inputs drive
outcomes. In one blatant example, an energy utility in the Pacific Northwest
regularly argued that its resource adequacy model demonstrated that it could not
retire old coal plants without sacrificing grid reliability.131 In reality, the utility
had set the parameters of the model to never consider reliability without existing
plants.132 Once the utility changed that parameter and allowed the model to
consider whether it could have sufficient energy generation without old coal
plants, the model output suggested that it could, in fact, retire plants without
sacrificing reliability.133 Garbage in, garbage out.
What focusing solely on inputs and parameters misses, though, are
opportunities to foster procedural equity (who decides and how, of Lasswell134).
As noted previously, the process of development is part of the algorithmic
system. The network of individuals and organizations involved in the
development of the model control what the inputs and parameters of the product
are.135 Beyond that, who is involved in the development of the model can also
influence the process of development itself—expanding or constraining the
world of stakeholders who could participate and influence the model.136 Put
another way, the rules and norms determining who is included in the
development process and how their contributions are incorporated (or not) into
the model influence access, and are therefore necessarily important for
procedural equity.

128. Id.
129. See generally Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 114 (2019) (discussing how for screening algorithms, discrimination in algorithm-assisted
decision making may be more apparent and fixable than discrimination among humans, without a machine
intermediary).
130. See Kleinberg et al., supra note 72, at 22; Kleinberg et al., supra note 129, at 118.
131. Interview with CPUC Staffer (2020).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. LASSWELL, supra note 99.
135. Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 824–31 fig.1.
136. Id.
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING VALUE-LADEN ASSUMPTIONS IN
ALGORITHM-ASSISTED DECISION MAKING
Drawing from the above literature review, I suggest the following six-part
framework for evaluating value-laden assumptions in algorithm-assisted
decision making (see Table 1). This framework is not intended to produce a
straight yes or no answer to whether any particular decision support program is
equitable or fully considers value-laden assumptions. It is intended, though, to
provide a structure to answer some of the concerns posed by Schneider. It is also
meant to serve as a guide for attorneys and policymakers for approaching
algorithm-assisted decision-making tools, and to focus attention on attributes that
may influence substantive and procedural equity in algorithm-assisted decision
making.
There are two important caveats to this framework. First, the framework is
primarily concerned with procedural equity. This is deliberate. Whether and to
what extent algorithm-assisted decision making creates hidden inequitable
impacts in energy or environmental processes, akin to say racial and gender bias
in future earnings calculations137 or biases in housing decisions,138 is not
currently known and is beyond the scope of this article to estimate. The tools
discussed here are different from those in security or financial decision making
in that natural resources and energy tools tend not to incorporate inputs from data
that have direct ties to race or gender of individuals. So, in the environmental,
energy, and natural resources context, following the inputs alone is not sufficient
to begin investigating potential disparate impacts linked to algorithmic tools.
Rather, opening up the design process and logic of the tools to inquiry, in other
words, focusing on procedural justice, is a necessary first step to identify
potential substantive equity issues.
Second, I am not suggesting in this Article that agencies should or should
not increase public participation efforts in the creation, choice, or
implementation of algorithmic tools. Broad inclusion efforts can backfire,
exacerbating power differences and mistrust and should therefore be done with
care and rigor.139 Meaningful participation takes time, can be costly, and
frequently requires technical capacity building or translation.140 What I am
suggesting is modest and pragmatic. Intermediate advocacy groups—for
137. Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Opinion The use of race- and sex-based data to
calculate damages is a stain on our legal system, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2021, 1:41 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/29/race-sex-based-data-legal-damages/.
138. Michele E. Gilman, Poverty Lawgorithms A Poverty Lawyer’s Guide to Fighting Automated
Decision-Making Harms on Low-Income Communities, DATA & SOCIETY (Sept. 15, 2020) (University of
Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3699650.
139. Thompson, supra note 124.
140. See id.; Sonya Ziaja, Lessons on Race and Place-Based Participation from Environmental
Justice and Geography, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 16, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/lessons-on-race-and-place-based-participation-from-environmental-justiceand-geography-by-sonya-ziaja/.
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example organizations like the Natural Resources Defense Council, which
already participate in environmental and energy policy processes, and have some
in-house expertise in energy and environmental issues—can use this framework
to assess value-laden assumptions in algorithmic tools, and meaningfully open
up this new policymaking fora to questions regarding equity in the world of
normal human communication and dialogue. To put this another way, algorithms
embed legal and policy assumptions without input from lawyers or
policymakers. This framework provides a way for those groups to engage in the
new fora.

Uncertainty

Table 1
Model Itself
How is governance and
conflict represented?
To what extent do the
model’s mechanisms for
assigning weighted
values and choosing
optimal solutions reflect
existing governance?

Transparency

What are the kinds of
uncertainty in the system
being modeled that
simplification may
obscure?
Is the logic of the model
explicable?
What aspects, if any, of
the model are “black
box” and unknowable?

Stakeholder
Collaboration

Are the inputs and
parameters open to
verification from outside
sources?
Is stakeholder
collaboration advisory
or determinative?
Is stakeholder
knowledge incorporated
into the model?

Design Process
How is uncertainty
communicated and to
whom?
Who is involved in
determining sources
of uncertainty?

Are participants in the
design and
implementation
known?

Who determines
which stakeholders
are relevant? With
what parameters? Can
stakeholders
themselves expand
who participates?
To what extent do
stakeholders
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determine processes
for collaboration?
How are
disagreements among
stakeholders and
designers resolved?

IV. CROSS CASE COMPARISON AND APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK
How would this framework function in practice? Depending on the
algorithms, some questions from the framework become more salient than
others. This is best seen through comparison across models. Below I present and
compare two models: one for water regulation and the other for energy planning.
The comparison reveals that while both models influence law and regulation of
these resources, they raise different issues of equity due to divergences in the
models’ design processes and logics.
A. Water Governance and Algorithm-Assisted Decision Making on the
Sacramento River
The water of the Sacramento River, from its snowy headwaters at Mt.
Shasta to its marshy delta, is the lifeblood of four competing uses: hydroelectric
power production, aquatic habitat, urban use, and agriculture.141 Although
allocation across these uses is not necessarily zero-sum, the timing, amount, and
quality for each of these uses can have negative implications for the others.142
For example, hydropower generation can negatively impact aquatic habitat, but
not total availability of water for urban or agricultural use.
Two systems regulate the flow and allocation of the Sacramento. There is
the physical system of reservoirs which stores, diverts, and releases water.143
Reservoirs also serve a role in flood control, releasing water before it topples
over the dam.144 And there is the social system of regulation, which depends on
laws, litigation, and the administrative state to determine how those reservoirs

141. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN: UPDATE 2018: MANAGING WATER
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABILITY 1-8 tbl.1-3 (2019), https://water.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/WebPages/Programs/California-Water-Plan/Docs/Update2018/Final/California-Water-Plan-Update2018.pdf.
142. See Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3; see also Carl J. Bauer, The Long View of the
Water/Energy Nexus Hydropower’s First Century in the U.S.A., 60 NAT. RES. J. 173 (2020); POSTEL &
RICHTER, supra note 4; Philip R. Wandschneider, Neoclassical and Institutionalist Explanations of
Changes in Northwest Water Institutions, 20 J. ECON. ISSUES 87, 97–99 (1986).
143. See CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 141.
144. See Ann D. Willis et al., Climate Change and Flood Operations in the Sacramento Basin,
California, 9 S.F. ESTUARY & WATERSHED SCI. 1, 1 (2011).
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operate.145 The two systems together determine who gets what quantity and flow
of water and when.146
From an engineering perspective, the main mechanism for managing water
for flood control, distributing water to cities and farms, and protecting stream
flow for aquatic habitat, is a single decision: when to release water from
reservoirs. That decision is predetermined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
for the large dams along the Sacramento River.147 When a reservoir is created,
the Army Corps of Engineers sets the maximum fill line for that reservoir, for
each month of the year. In water management jargon, this is called the “rule
curve.”148 Of course, the rule curve does not prevent rain from falling or snow
from melting; so, as “new” water enters the system behind the dam, the dam
operator must release existing water to keep the maximum fill line at the Corps’
specified limit.
Climate change challenges the prevailing operating rules and regulations
for dams.149 For most federal and federally funded dams, rule curves were set in
the mid-twentieth century and were based on a limited historical sample of
weather.150 Those fundamental assumptions about seasonal precipitation,
temperature, and evaporation rates no longer hold true.151 Changing them to fit
the emerging reality of climate change for any given reservoir is more politically
difficult than one might expect. The rule curves for many large dams were
created before the National Environmental Protection Act; changing the rules
would require National Environmental Protection Act compliance, with
associated costs and, at times, difficult reflections.152 So, absent an act of
Congress to either create an exemption or increase funding to the Corps, the old
rules largely remain.
The network of state and federal law governing the physical regulation of
the Sacramento River requires close coordination between state and federal
agencies153—so close, in fact, that the federal agencies (National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation) and the California
145. See Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3; see generally Bauer, supra note 142.
146. See J.B. Ruhl & Robin Craig, 4°C, 106 MINN. L. REV. 191, 255 (2021).
147. See U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, NEW BULLARDS BAR DAM AND RESERVOIR, NORTH YUBA
RIVER, CALIFORNIA: WATER CONTROL MANUAL (2004).
148. Willis et al., supra note 144, at 1.
149. See Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3; see also Willis et al., supra note 144, at 2.
150. See Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 343–44.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 343–44; Willis et al., supra note 144, at 3.
153. See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 833 tbl.2 (on the energy side, the
California Independent Systems Operator and the California Public Utilities Commission oversees energy
procurement, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses hydropower operations; on the water
side, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation operates large multipurpose hydropower projects, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers sets operating rules for maximum fill level of reservoirs, the State Water Resources
Control Board oversees water quality licensing, the California Department of Water operates the state’s
large water conveyance system; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration , the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the California Department of Fish and Wildlife all oversee aspects of aquatic habitat
and species protection); Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 335–43.
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Department of Water Resources share offices at the Joint Operations Center in
Sacramento.154 And while federal and state civil servants at the Joint Operations
Center do communicate, the operating rules for the dams along the Sacramento
River are largely uncommunicative to each other. Among the myriad agency
rules for regulating stream flow from hydropower projects, few were designed
with the other rules in mind.155 And barely any of the operating rules consider
the impact of the other dams along the same river.156 On a systemwide level, it
never made much sense for purposes of energy production, irrigation, or habitat
protection, that operating rules are developed or implemented in isolation.157
Climate change simply makes that more apparent by narrowing the margins for
error.158
Algorithm-assisted decision making has proven to be a useful workaround
to these limitations of existing law. After a decade of testing and modifications
to water management algorithms, the California Department of Water Resources
installed software at the Joint Operations Center.159 The software, a program
called INFORM, works alongside human water managers to regulate the flow of
the Sacramento River.160 What INFORM does, that the law does not, is
coordinate reservoir operations across multiple spatial and temporal scales, while
including short- and long-term weather and climate forecasts.161 Here’s what that
means in practice.
Existing law and regulation are represented in INFORM through
operational rules. These rules function by assigning numerical values to
competing reservoir operations objectives—for instance, the highest values for
flood control and the lowest values for hydroelectric power.162 These are fed
through a model that allocates water by optimizing for irrigation, habitat, energy,
and other uses, while meeting minimum flow requirements across multiple
reservoirs along the Sacramento River—represented as “nodes” in the INFORM

154. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER
(2021), https://www.usbr.gov/mp/mpr-news/docs/factsheets/joc.pdf. For a livelier read about what the
facility is like, see JOAN DIDION, Holy Water, in THE WHITE ALBUM 59 (1979).
155. See Joshua H. Viers, Hydropower Relicensing and Climate Change, 47 J. AM. WATER RES.
ASS’N 655, 657–58 (2011); Willis et al., supra note 144, at 8 (A notable exception to this is the New
Bullards Bar dam, whose operating manual mandates coordination with the St. Mary’s dam, which was
never built).
156. See Viers, supra note 155, at 658–59; see also Willis et al., supra note 144, at 4 (explaining that
a notable exception to this is the New Bullards Bar dam, whose operating manual mandates coordination
with the St. Mary’s dam, which was never built).
157. See Viers, supra note 155, at 657–59.
158. See Huaming Yao & Aris Georgakakos, Assessment of Folsom Lake Response to Historical and
Potential Future Climate Scenarios 2. Reservoir Management, 249 J. HYDROLOGY 176, 187–88 (2001)
(discussing penalty parameters); see also Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 356–57.
159. See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 837 fig.4.
160. See id. at 827.
161. See id.
162. See Yao & Georgakakos, supra note 158, at 187–88 (discussing penalty parameters); Ziaja,
Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 356–57.
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system.163 The outputs of the optimization model are combined into model sets,
which incorporate water-supply forecast over multiple time scales, incorporating
short-term weather forecasts and long-term climate scenarios for the Sacramento
River.164 After a human water manager chooses the specific time horizon,
INFORM then creates “runs” from the model sets and evaluates tradeoffs for
water uses, before finally presenting the water manager with analyzed results for
“optimal” operations management.165 What multi-year studies confirm is that
INFORM outperforms normal reservoir decision making for all objectives:
hydroelectric generation, instream water use, and agricultural and urban water
distribution.166
What is remarkable about INFORM from a legal and public policy
perspective is that its representation of law and policy depends not just on law
on the books, but also informal law as practiced and interpreted by water
managers.167 The development of INFORM depended on interviews and
collaborations with a group of informed stakeholders and end-users from state
and federal agencies.168 Those collaborations influenced both the process used
to develop and refine INFORM, and the final product itself.169 Specifically,
through interviews with reservoir operators, the INFORM design team learned
that there were instances where operators felt they could deviate, even minutely,
from regulations on the books.170 The design team incorporated these
perceptions and practices into the algorithms of INFORM.171
B. Integrated Resource Planning for Renewable Energy Build Out and
Algorithm-Assisted Decision Making
By law, the energy system in California must change to reduce
emissions.172 By necessity, the same system must adapt to a changing climate.173
The regulatory body tasked with ensuring that private energy utilities meet

163. See KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., HRC – GWI FINAL REPORT: INTEGRATED FORECAST
RESERVOIR MANAGEMENT (INFORM): IMPLEMENTATION OF A STAND-ALONE OPERATIONAL
INFORM SYSTEM FOR THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES (DWR) 23, 27, 104 (2018).
164. See id. at 27, 101.
165. See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 827–28.
166. See GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., supra note 158.
167. See generally Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3.
168. For a detailed discussion on the history of INFORM, see generally id.
169. Id. at 824–31 fig.1.
170. See Ziaja, Rules and Values, supra note 3, at 356–57.
171. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Konstantine Georgakakos, Hydrologic Rsch. Ctr.,
Scripps Inst. of Oceanography, San Diego, CA. (Dec. 6, 2016); see also Interview with Guido Franco,
Cal. Energy Comm’n, Sacramento, CA. (Apr. 6, 2016).
172. Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015, S.B. 350, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2015); see also 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1–2 (Cal.
2018).
173. See generally 2 FOURTH ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 6.
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renewable generation, grid reliability, and emissions reduction goals relies on a
mathematical model to identify gaps in energy generation buildout.174
California’s legislature has set increasingly ambitious targets to reduce
GHG emissions, beginning with the passage of the California Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006.175 By 2015, the legislature, in SB 350, set GHG emissions
and renewable energy development targets for regulated electric utilities,176
reducing “emissions by 40 percent by 2030, including efforts to achieve at least
50 percent renewable energy procurement, doubling of energy efficiency, and
promoting transportation electrification.”177 The same law requires each
regulated energy utility to submit a plan for renewable energy development—an
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP)—to be evaluated by the California Public
Utilities Commission (the Commission).178 In most states, the goals of the IRP
process would be handled through federally-regulated balancing authorities.179
But, California’s experience with failed deregulation in the 1990s, and growing
environmental concerns in the 2000s, led the state to give authority to develop
energy procurement planning to the Commission, keeping renewable energy
concerns under state rather than federal oversight.180 So, in response to SB 350,
the Commission established the IRP and Long Term Procurement Plan (IRPLTPP), an “umbrella” administrative proceeding to evaluate electricity
procurement policies and capacity requirements.181
The Commission opened a quasi-legislative rulemaking to comply with the
IRP directive in SB 350, resulting in an order a year later.182 The order broadly
outlined critical IRP implementation issues and addressed the need to undertake
“comprehensive resource optimization,” rather than planning on a resource-

174. See generally RESOLVE Renewable Energy Solutions Model, ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC.
(E3), https://www.ethree.com/tools/resolve-renewable-energy-solutions-model/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2021).
175. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2006).
176. Cal. S.B. 350.
177. Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015 (SB 350), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/sb350/ (SB 350 “requires the CPUC to focus energy procurement decisions on
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 40 percent by 2030, including efforts to achieve at least 50
percent renewable energy procurement, doubling of energy efficiency, and promoting transportation
electrification”).
178. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.51–52; see also CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 16-02-007, ORDER
INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO DEVELOP AN ELECTRICITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING
FRAMEWORK AND TO COORDINATE AND REFINE LONG-TERM PROCUREMENT PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
(2016) [hereinafter 2016 ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING].
179. For an overview of federally-regulated balancing authorities, see Hoff, supra note 31.
180. For a brief overview of deregulation and its aftermath, see CARL PECHMAN, CALIFORNIA’S
ELECTRICITY MARKET A POST-CRISIS PROGRESS REPORT 2–4 (2007), https://www.ppic.org/wpcontent/uploads/content/pubs/cep/EP_107CPEP.pdf.
181. See 2016 ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING, supra note 178, at 3, 25; see also Integrated
Resource Plan and Long Term Procurement Plan (IRP-LTPP), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/irp/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
182. See generally 2016 ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING, supra note 178.
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specific basis.183 The Commission contracted with an energy and environmental
consulting firm, Energy and Environmental Economics Inc. (or E3), to develop
a decision support tool to assess energy procurement scenarios called
“RESOLVE.”184
RESOLVE is a capacity expansion model. It solves for optimal capital
allocation,185 grid reliability (whether energy supply meets demand throughout
the year), and GHG targets.186 The model conducts capacity expansion—
building out virtual energy generation—to meet forecasted load growth, while
complying with exogenously set GHG emissions constraints and resource
adequacy requirements in a least-cost manner.187 RESOLVE is not intended to
dictate outcomes on its own. Its results are supposed to be advisory to the
Commission.188
Like all models, RESOLVE necessarily depends on some simplification of
the physical, legal, and political world it is representing. Geography and time in
RESOLVE work differently than in reality. If RESOLVE were a person, and
asked to draw what it thought California looked like, it would draw eleven
separate buckets—each representing a different section of the California grid, or
“renewable resource and transmission development zones.”189 Inside the
buckets, there would not be any local distribution lines delivering energy to
homes. What there would be, though, are four key inputs: the total amount of
renewable energy generation that can be built; the energy output of renewables
in each zone; the availability of transmission lines to integrate new
renewables;190 and the local resource adequacy constraints.191

183. See id.
184. See generally RESOLVE Renewable Energy Solutions Model, ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC.
(E3), https://www.ethree.com/tools/resolve-renewable-energy-solutions-model/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2021).
185. The capital cost allocation mechanism is important here because unlike thermal generation,
wind and solar energy generation does not require fuel; so the more renewable generation is integrated
into the grid, the higher the percentage of capital costs. Interview M. Chhabra (November 2020) (on file
with author).
186. ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC., RESOLVE CAPACITY EXPANSION MODEL: USER MANUAL 3–4
(2019), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integratedresource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/2019-2020-irp-events-and-materials/resolveuser-guide—-public-release-20191106.pdf.
187. Inputs & Assumptions: 2019-2020 Integrated Resource Planning, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 4–
5 (NOVEMBER 2019),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/
documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/2019-2020-irp-eventsand-materials/inputs--assumptions-2019-2020-cpuc-irp_20191106.pdf.
188. See 2016 ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING, supra note 178, at 13–15.
189. Nick Schlag et al., RESOLVE Model Overview IRP Modeling Advisory Group 15 (2016).
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/files/legacyfiles/i/6442451316-irp-mag-e3-resolve-201610-20.pdf.
190. Id. (Slide 16: This input dictates when the model builds more renewables without transmission,
or more renewables alongside new transmission).
191. Local resource adequacy, for example, considers how much energy production capacity must
exist in each bucket, considering how much each bucket could import from the others. Id. at Slide 16.
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RESOLVE’s sense of time is similarly idiosyncratic. Instead of representing
sequential weather conditions that lead to changes in the number of heating
degree days or cooling degree days—needed to measure resource adequacy on a
day to day level—RESOLVE relies on a selection of weather data from thirtyseven, non-sequential days to represent the range of weather conditions in a
year.192 Despite its oddities, or perhaps because of them, RESOLVE has been
used to great effect by other jurisdictions like Hawaiʻi193 and the Pacific
Northwest’s Public Generating Pool.194 RESOLVE’s core simplification
(geography in buckets, and time as non-sequential samples) makes quickly
running different scenarios feasible. Problems arise, though, when RESOLVE’s
outputs are taken to be prescriptive.
C. Comparison of Value-Laden Assumptions in INFORM and RESOLVE across
Uncertainty, Transparency, and Stakeholder Participation
The framework divides algorithm-assisted decision-making tools into two
components: the model itself and the design process behind the model. Under
each, questions target how uncertainty, transparency, and stakeholder
collaboration lead to or resolve value-laden assumptions. The answers to these
questions uncover how the values of the network designing the model are
embedded in the algorithms.
1. Uncertainty
The bulk of the framework’s investigation into uncertainty is on the model
side. The framework first considers how governance and conflict are represented.
Governance here means the mechanisms by which choices between objectives
are determined. In both INFORM and RESOLVE, the mechanism of governance
is literally mechanical, a quantified optimization problem. The choice of which
course of action, whether reservoir operation or building renewable energy, is
determined by assigning values and solving for least-cost solutions. In essence,
they function much like market mechanisms—given no externalities.
The framework then asks about the extent to which the model’s mechanisms
for assigning weighted values and choosing optimal solutions reflect existing
governance. INFORM and RESOLVE both diverge significantly from existing
real-world governance. In the real world, governance of multi-objective
reservoirs is determined through law, negotiated agreements between state and

192. Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
193. See Case Study Cost Effective Pathways to Hawaii’s 100 Percent RPS Goal, ENERGY & ENV’T
ECON., INC. (E3), https://www.ethree.com/projects/cost-effective-pathways-hawaiis-100-percent-rpsgoal/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
194. See Case Study Study of Policies to Decarbonize Electric Sector in the Northwest I Public
Generating Pool, 2017 – Present, ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC. (E3), https://www.ethree.com/projects/
study-policies-decarbonize-electric-sector-northwest-public-generating-pool-2017-present/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2021).
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federal governments, and litigation.195 The “value” of choices and their
consequences are not determined by numerical value or exchange value, but
through deliberation.196 Governance of renewable energy build out and planning
for energy resource adequacy is a bit different from water resources governance
because it includes real world market mechanisms,197 in addition to law and local
utility regulation. So, RESOLVE determines numerical values for future
renewable build out to meet GHG reduction, future energy needs, and resource
adequacy goals. As one stakeholder put it, “[t]he trouble is that these values are
determined by key inputs and assumptions of how the market would work and
how regulations would be enforced; i.e., these are most likely outcomes given
perfect knowledge of future market forces, regulation, and politics. But things
don’t always play out as planned.”198 For example, economic pressures external
to those considered in RESOLVE could force existing gas-powered plants to
suddenly retire, as several in California did.199 Such retirements change the type
and amount of renewable generation actually needed for resource adequacy. In
short, there are numerical values associated with energy build out and resource
adequacy that drive RESOLVE. The trouble for RESOLVE is that it is the
modelers who choose what those values are, rather than arriving at those values
as the result of a true market.
Building from these two initial questions, the framework then inquires
about the kind of social-ecological-technical system being represented, whether
there are sources of inherent uncertainty in such a system, and whether
simplification preserves or obscures those sources. INFORM, for example, can
only model and represent a few of aspects of the Sacramento River.200 It does
not consider how habitat or population changes may develop with climate change
or how changes to reservoir operations influences instream temperature for
various threatened species.201
As one member of a technical advisory committee to RESOLVE put it, “[the
model] is deterministic and doesn’t model uncertainty.”202 The simplified
governance mechanism in RESOLVE may obscure uncertainty surrounding a
key input. For energy modeling, it is difficult to tell what the price of energy will
be because prices are influenced by exogenous factors to the market. For

195. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, FACT SHEET: DECISION ON 2019-20 ELECTRIC RESOURCE
PORTFOLIOS TO INFORM INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANS AND TRANSMISSION PLANNING (2020),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/files/legacyfiles/i/6442464699-irp-2019-rsp-fact-sheetv3.pdf.
196. Inputs & Assumptions, supra note 187, at 4-5.
197. Id. (California did experiment with relying solely on market mechanisms during deregulation,
which resulted in part in massive rolling brown outs and inflated consumer costs).
198. Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
199. See Mark Specht, Natural Gas Power Plant Retirements in California, UNION CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS: EQUATION (Feb. 25, 2019), https://blog.ucsusa.org/mark-specht/gas-retirements-california/.
200. See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 837.
201. Id.
202. Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
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example, regional balancing authorities, under federal guidance, can require
utilities to enter into energy procurement contracts with specific generation
sources, in order to ensure resource adequacy.203 Balancing authorities also can
set the price for those contracts.204 The existence of those contracts can shift the
market price for other energy procurement.205 The influence of these contracts
is not modeled in RESOLVE.206 Yet, energy price inputs in RESOLVE are
outcome determinative.207
Turning to uncertainty in the design process, the framework asks about the
social processes surrounding communication of uncertainty: How is uncertainty
communicated and to whom? Who is involved in determining sources of
uncertainty? The INFORM research team communicated uncertainty in the
model to the working group at semiannual working group meetings.208 The
working group similarly discussed system uncertainty with the researchers at the
same meetings.209 For RESOLVE, model uncertainty is discussed openly by the
modelers to the working group.210
2. Transparency
Transparency is closely related to uncertainty. The more uncertainty exists
(both known and unknown) in a model, the less transparent it is likely to be. But,
as the framework questions and literature review above illustrate, there are other
influences on transparency. The framework begins by asking whether the logic
of a model is explicable. This question is not concerned with sources of
uncertainty from inputs, parameters, or the system being represented. It simply
asks whether it can be explained how an algorithmic tool arrives at its conclusion.
There are degrees of transparency and opacity here. An algorithmic tool
could be a black box, such that even its designers are not clear on how the
program learns and produces outcomes.211 There are models that are relatively
simple, like RESOLVE. And then there are models whose logic is nominally
explicable, but difficult for even experts to understand. INFORM falls into this
latter category. The math behind INFORM is not unknowable, but it is especially

203. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of
Restructuring (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21113, 2015), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w21113/w21113.pdf; Severin Borenstein et al., Expecting the Unexpected
Emissions Uncertainty and Environmental Market Design 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 20999, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20999/w20999.pdf.
204. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 203; Borenstein et al., supra note at 4.
205. See generally Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 203; Borenstein et al., supra note 203.
206. See ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC., supra note 186, at 3–4.
207. See id.; Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
208. Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3.
209. See id.
210. Interview with E3 staff (February 4, 2021) (on file with author); Interview with CPUC Staffer,
supra note 131; Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
211. Note, this is a significant problem for many kinds of machine-learning. Ananny & Crawford,
supra note 42.
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complicated. There is a story from the history of INFORM, prior to its adoption,
in which the Department of Water Resources was approached to potentially fund
the development of INFORM. As the story goes, the Department refused, stating
that the math was “too complex.”212 In response, the researchers brought in a
trusted third-party water expert, winner of a MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship, to
give the Department his take.213 He blessed the project, but noted that he did not
understand the math either.214 Answers to this question, therefore, will vary
based on who is trying to understand the model, and are likely to be subjective
in most cases.
The framework also asks a more objective question regarding transparency
in the model: whether the inputs and parameters are open to verification from
outside sources. The Commission requires that RESOLVE be transparent.215 It
operates under a public license and the data sources are likewise open to the
public.216 Because INFORM is operated by the Department of Water Resources,
its inputs are subject to the state’s public records act.217 However, some
parameters are opaquer. From prior interviews it is evident that when developing
the model, the researchers consulted reservoir operators and included parameters
to represent circumstances under which operators felt they could deviate from
law on the books.218 But none of the researchers interviewed could recall what
those parameters were.219 The result is that there are elements of the model that
are obscured and may no longer be knowable.
Regarding the design process, the framework posits another objective
question: are the participants in the design and implementation known? In the
case of the two models discussed here, both RESOLVE and INFORM are state
funded and the development and implementation process are matters of public
record. In both cases, the participants are known or discoverable.
3. Stakeholder Collaboration
Both INFORM and RESOLVE have had technical advisory groups, where
outside interested parties can ask questions about the model and collaborate in
its design. How those groups came to be, their operating rules, and their roles
diverge. INFORM’s technical advisory group developed as a result of contract
requirements between California and the researchers developing the model, in

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3 at 838.
See id.
See id.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 195.
See RESOLVE Model Inputs and Results Used for 2019 IRP Reference System Plan Decision,
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electricalenergy/electric-power-procurement/long-term-procurement-planning/2019-20-irp-events-andmaterials/resolve-model-inputs-and-results-used-for-2019-irp-reference-system-plan-decision.
217. See California Public Records Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–6270.7.
218. Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3 at 827–28.
219. Id.
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addition to the researchers’ own interest in collaborative design.220 The technical
advisory group started relatively small and later expanded as group members
suggested bringing in other technical experts.221 Participants in the collaboration
were therefore all part of the same network of highly technical experts who knew
one another.
For RESOLVE, the Commission required a technical advisory group and
held working group meetings to facilitate collaboration.222 The meetings are
open to the public;223 in theory, anyone could attend and add their input. But the
Commission proceedings are highly specialized and technical. Meetings are also
held during normal working hours,224 making it very difficult for a person or
group to contribute unless doing so is already tied to their profession. The result,
in practice, is that all members of the working group are industry insiders.
The framework begins by asking two questions about stakeholder
collaboration and the functioning of the model itself. First, is stakeholder
collaboration advisory or determinative? For INFORM’s process, stakeholder
collaboration was determinative. It also depended on consensus decision making.
No one voice controlled.225 For RESOLVE, the working group is purely
advisory. It is ultimately up to the modelers and the Commission to decide what
inputs and design parameters to use. Second, and related, is stakeholder
knowledge incorporated into the model? For both RESOLVE and INFORM,
knowledge from the working groups changed inputs to the model.226
The framework then turns to three sets of questions regarding the design
process. First, who determines which stakeholders are relevant and included in
the process? Those who determined the stakeholders relevant to the development
of INFORM changed over time.227 At the beginning, the researchers took an
interest in developing connections with specific federal and state agencies that
could end up using their product.228 From there, once the product development
was funded by government agencies, those agencies determined which additional
stakeholders should be on the technical advisory committee for the project.229
However, once the advisory committee began to meet, the participants could, and
did, suggest additional stakeholders who would be interested in the outcome or

220. See id. at 838.
221. See id at 839.
222. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, IRP MODELING ADVISORY GROUP CHARTER (2019),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/files/uploadedfiles/cpucwebsite/content/
utilitiesindustries/energy/energyprograms/electpowerprocurementgeneration/irp/2018/irp-modelingadvisory-group-charter-v7.pdf.
223. Id.
224. Interview with E3 staff, supra note 210; Interview with CPUC Staffer, supra note 131.
225. Interview with working group participants (on file with author).
226. For detailed INFORM results from the working group, see Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks,
supra note 3, at 824–31 Fig.1.
227. Id. at 836–39.
228. Id. at 836–38.
229. Id.
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who could provide specific input to shape the model.230 Thus, stakeholders could
expand who participated in the design process of INFORM. The process was
different for RESOLVE. On paper, it was the administrative law judge, with
advice from a staffer within the analysis division of the Commission, who
weighed the input and advice of stakeholders before determining which
comments influence the development of RESOLVE.231 In practice, the opinions
of the regulated utilities, the expertise of the modelers, and the political pressures
of the moment can add a thumb to the scale.
Second, to what extent do stakeholders determine processes for
collaboration? For RESOLVE, stakeholders do not formally drive the
collaboration, but rather the process is determined by the Commission.232
However, since several of the participants are from organizations with few staff,
some will informally work together, strategize, and jointly submit comments to
divide up the work.233 For INFORM, the minimum standards for collaboration
were set by the funding agencies.234 Once initial advisory group meetings took
place, stakeholders and researchers jointly determined the process for
collaboration.235
And third, how are disagreements among stakeholders and designers
resolved? This question gets at the power dynamics between stakeholders and
designers. The answers determine whose vision, and at times associated
assumptions, are embedded in the algorithmic tools. For INFORM, disagreement
was resolved through discussion of working group members and researchers.236
For RESOLVE, disagreements are synthesized by the assigned administrative
law judge, who then makes a recommendation to the Commission.237
V. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
Drawing from Wilder and Ingram’s concept of equity,238 we can now
“engag[e] in a process of critical inquiry that delves into . . . the openness and

230. Id. at 839.
231. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S RULING SEEKING COMMENTS

ON PROPOSED
PREFERRED SYSTEM PLAN, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONTINUE ELECTRIC INTEGRATED
RESOURCE PLANNING AND RELATED PROCUREMENT PROCESSES (Aug. 17, 2021) https://docs.cpuc.ca.
gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M399/K450/399450008.PDF.
232. Interview with working group participants, supra note 225.
233. Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
234. See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3, at 843.
235. Id. at 839.
236. Interviews with working group participants, supra note 225.
237. Id. For an example of comments, see Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) on 2019-2020 Electric Resource Portfolios to Inform Integrated Resource Plans and
Transmission Planning, in Order Instituting Rulemaking to Develop an Electricity Integrated Resource
Planning Framework and to Coordinate and Refine Long Term Procurement Planning Requirements (Mar.
12, 2020), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M329/K437/329437858.PDF.
238. See Wilder & Ingram, supra note 116.
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accessibility of political arenas, an appraisal of what and who is being served
by . . . decisions, and what and who may be left out.”239
On its face, a straight comparison of the two models, without considering
the design process, would suggest that RESOLVE is more transparent than
INFORM. While the internal logics of INFORM and RESOLVE are largely
similar in that they solve for least-cost solutions to given parameters, they differ
in their complexity. A core attribute of RESOLVE that makes it appealing to
multiple jurisdictions is the relative simplicity of its design and how easily it is
explained to decision makers. INFORM, on the other hand, is tailored to a single
jurisdiction, significantly more complicated, and difficult to explain.
Transparency, however, is not the same as accessibility.240 Even though
RESOLVE is relatively simple, its limitations are routinely misunderstood, even
by informed members of the technical advisory group.241 In interviews with
modelers, members of the technical advisory committee, and end users, there
was no similar evidence that INFORM was misunderstood.242 This is notable
since both RESOLVE and INFORM had educational components and
opportunities for collaboration built into their design processes. Both had
technical advisory committees that met regularly with the modelers.
But there are key differences between these two advisory committees.
RESOLVE’s committee is nominally more open. Parties to the quasi-legislative
proceeding vary in the kind of expertise they bring, their organizational missions,
and their technical capacity. Within the Commission itself, a high turnover rate
among staff results in lack of institutional memory from meeting to meeting.243
Membership on INFORM’s committee, on the other hand, was essentially by
invitation only. Even though the network that comprised INFORM’s committee
expanded over time, the characteristics of the members remained stable.244
Everyone was an expert in the field and had a background as a researcher or as a
worker in state or federal civil service.245
It seems from these two cases that for stakeholders to understand the models
and therefore be able to meaningfully contribute to their development, those
stakeholders need an extraordinarily high level of technical expertise, and the
available time (or economic interest) to commit to providing input. For both
INFORM and RESOLVE, the network of active and expert stakeholders
influences the inputs and parameters for the two tools—driving the development
and implementation of water and energy regulation, and those systems’
adaptation to climate change. Ultimately, these networks are embodied in the
decision support systems they create.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
See, e.g., Ananny & Crawford, supra note 42.
Interview with E3 staff, supra note 210; Interview with M. Chhabra, supra note 185.
Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3.
Interviews with working group participants, supra note 225.
See Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks, supra note 3.
Id.
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Here, we run straight into the main tension between the need to rely on these
tools and the need for participation. If (1) the focus on equity is who is being left
out and whether the political arena is open and accessible; (2) the ability to
influence algorithm-assisted decision-making tools depends on high technical
capacity along with an economic or mission interest; and (3) the network of
people and organizations who do participate in the development of the model
influence inputs and parameters which embed value-laden assumptions and
biases; then are algorithmic tools destined to be inequitable in environmental
governance? And because of our dependence on these tools, are environmental,
natural resource, and energy planning doomed to be increasingly inaccessible
and inequitable with greater complexity? Possibly.
But the two cases and the framework provide some hope. Even though not
all stakeholders in the RESOLVE process completely understood the model, they
nonetheless are able to comment and raise their concerns to decision makers and
modelers alike. At a minimum, this means that decision makers are at least aware
of the concerns and can act accordingly. The open process of development still
serves a governance function. The history of INFORM, meanwhile,
demonstrates that close collaboration between modelers and stakeholders is
possible. In short, there are degrees of accessibility. Both INFORM and
RESOLVE could have had far more closed processes.
In the end, the framework presented in this Article can be boiled down to a
single question: is equity (substantive and procedural) included in the network
for producing algorithmic tools? By assessing how uncertainty is created and
communicated, the extent to which a model and its process of development are
transparent, and the role of stakeholders in the production of the model, the
framework provides a way for legal practitioners and advocates to approach the
question of equity in algorithm-assisted decision making. It also allows them to
become involved in making these tools more equitable.
CONCLUSION
What is at issue when considering algorithm-assisted decision making in
environmental law is not programming, the rise of machines, or any such prelude
to sci-fi fantasy. What we are talking about is a new kind of augmented
governance.246 In essence, these algorithmic tools are new fora for decision
making and the development of law to take place. This kind of forum has
different rules than a legislative body, court, or city council; the rules in the new
forum require abstraction, simplification, and quantification to function. The
process by which values are defined, debated, and weighed in democratic
institutions is fundamentally different from how values are determined in
algorithm-assisted decision making. The players in the forum are different as
246. Notably, computer models in American environmental law have been around for over 40 years.
See, e.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 54. However, compared to other governance fora in democracies, for
example, legislatures, courts, or even administrative agencies, these are still quite new.
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well. Instead of lawyers, judges, commissioners, or legislators, the new forum
relies on engineers, programmers, and a variety of technical experts. It is still
governance, though, subject to the same concerns and deserving of the same level
of scrutiny as more longstanding institutions. Concerns about existing power
imbalances in decision making across race, class, or geography247 are relevant
to how decisions are made within mathematical models.
For climate adaptation and complex water and energy system planning, this
is an indispensable form of governance. Although it is not, and should not be
expected to be, a crystal ball into the future, algorithm-assisted decision making
provides decision makers and stakeholders with multiple possible scenarios,
which can account for potential changes to short- and long-term climate. As seen
in INFORM, these tools also offer a quick workaround to some of the inherited
shortcomings of existing water and energy law. As seen in RESOLVE, these
tools also influence how regulators conceptualize existing energy issues and plan
for the future. In short, algorithm-assisted decision-making tools influence what
environmental law is and how regulation is implemented.
The trade-off for all of us is that access and accountability are sacrificed in
this new forum.248 Few decisions have such a direct impact on the health and
wellbeing of communities and ecosystems as choices in water and energy
regulation. Even absent climate change, decisions about energy and water are
highly technical, jargon-laden, and nuanced. Nonetheless, organizations,
scholars, and litigators invest time and expertise to communicate potential
inequities in water and energy decision making to the public and hold decision
makers accountable. In the new forum of algorithm-assisted decision making,
uncertainty and lack of transparency can make doing so near impossible.
The framework I propose in this Article offers a practical means for
attorneys, watchdog organizations, and responsible decision makers to examine
and assess algorithmic tools in a holistic manner. By considering sources of
value-laden assumptions across uncertainty, transparency, and stakeholder
collaboration, this framework indicates inflection points for substantive equity.
By also considering the process of development, this framework incorporates
lessons from the past two decades of social science on the importance of
networks for the legitimacy and acceptability of scientific products.
It is an old trope that law was the last profession to give up the feather
quill.249 We do not have the luxury of time, in this case, to ignore that algorithmic
247. See Ziaja, supra note 140.
248. This is not to say that older fora are necessarily open and transparent or do not create issues of
subordination. See Michael B. Gerrard, Presidential Progress on Climate Change Will the Courts
Interfere With What Needs to Be Done to Save Our Planet?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y at 2 (2021) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s shadow docket and unsigned order staying the Clean Power Plan),
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2740; Matthew B. Lawrence, Subordination
and Separation of Powers, 131 YALE L.J. 78 (2021). But at least they are in language we can criticize and
discuss.
249. In more contemporary terms, it is among the last to give up Word Perfect.
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tools are becoming part of the fabric of environmental law. These tools are not
going away. And, because they are by nature technical, necessarily rely on
simplifications, and embed the value-laden assumptions and biases of the
networks that create them, these tools threaten to deepen the divide between
technocracy and democratic participation in environmental decision making,
while eroding equity. Without more active participation in their development and
implementation from a broader range of stakeholders (let alone lawyers and
policymakers), the rules by which these tools operate and the rules they begin to
impose on social and ecological systems will be driven by the value-laden
assumptions of a remarkably small group of people. It is imperative to understand
these tools on their own terms, while finding ways to bring them more in line
with ideals of democratic participation and processes; to compare their
understanding of governance to what we want governance to be; to understand
how these tools influence existing governance; and to develop assessment tools
and aids to foster substantive and procedural equity in their development. I
present the framework and examples here to begin this needed work and to offer
them as an invitation to dialogue.
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